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CASE NOTES 
MCKINNON V SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY* 
THE SIR HUMPHREY CLAUSE — REVIEW OF CONCLUSIVE 
CERTIFICATES IN FREEDOM OF INFORMATION APPLICATIONS 
JUDITH BANNISTER† 
[In the recent McKinnon decision the High Court considered access to Treasury documents under 
the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) where the Minister had issued a ‘conclusive’ certificate 
that disclosure was contrary to the public interest. The case is fundamentally about who decides 
what is in the public interest, and whether there is any scope for independent external review of a 
Minister’s decision.] 
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I   INTRODUCTION 
On 6 September 2006, the High Court dismissed an appeal brought by Michael 
McKinnon, the Freedom of Information Editor at The Australian newspaper.1 In 
2002 McKinnon sought access under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) 
(‘FOI Act’) to Treasury documents concerning bracket creep in income tax and 
possible misuse of the First Home Owners Scheme $7000 grant. The Treasury 
refused access to most of the documents, relying predominantly upon the 
exemption for internal working documents, and also in some instances for 
documents which would reveal business affairs.2 After an internal review the 
 
 * (2006) 229 ALR 187 (‘McKinnon’). 
 † BA (SAIT), LLB (Hons) (Adel); Solicitor of the Supreme Court of New South Wales; Lecturer, 
School of Law, Flinders University. 
 1 McKinnon (2006) 229 ALR 187, 207 (Hayne J), 222 (Callinan and Heydon JJ). Gleeson CJ and 
Kirby J dissented: at 193. 
 2 FOI Act ss 36(1), 43. 
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Treasurer, Peter Costello, signed a certificate which, under the Act, established 
conclusively that disclosure of the internal working documents would be 
contrary to the public interest.3 
McKinnon took the matter to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the Federal 
Court and the High Court.4 His appeals were dismissed at all levels. This case is 
not about whether it is, or is not, in the public interest to know about how taxes 
are being collected and spent. Rather, the case is fundamentally about who 
decides what is ‘in the public interest’, and whether there is any scope for 
independent external review of that decision. Specifically, the appeal to the Full 
Federal Court and the High Court concerned how the Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal should approach the limited review of conclusive certificates allowed 
for under the legislation and whether the Tribunal had made an error of law when 
it found that there were reasonable grounds to support the claims made by the 
Treasurer in the certificates. 
The High Court decision in McKinnon left the Administrative Appeals Tribu-
nal with very little to do when faced with conclusive certificates. Kirby J 
expressed some cynicism about the provision in the Act allowing for conclusive 
certificates when the case was argued before the High Court. Alluding to Sir 
Humphrey Appleby, a fictional civil servant in the 1980s BBC television comedy 
series Yes Minister and its sequel Yes, Prime Minister, Kirby J said: ‘the first 
answer might be that this was a Sir Humphrey clause: “This was put in to give 
the appearance of having this high level tribunal with judges and others to 
review but really, Minister, it gives them nothing to do.”’5 
I I   LIMITED REVIEW BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL 
The normal function of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal is to undertake 
merits review by considering a matter again from the beginning and substituting 
the Tribunal’s decision for that of the original decision-maker.6 However, the 
Tribunal’s review is constrained in relation to exempt documents under the FOI 
Act. Once it is established that a document falls within one of the exemptions, 
‘the Tribunal does not have power to decide that access to the document, so far 
as it contains exempt matter, is to be granted’.7 So, while government agencies 
and Ministers can decide to release documents even though they are protected by 
one of the exemptions, the Tribunal does not have the power to make that 
decision. There are a wide range of exemptions in Part IV of the Act, including 
where documents affect national security, international and inter-state relations, 
law enforcement, or personal privacy, where documents are of the Cabinet or the 
Executive Council, would reveal business affairs, or are internal working 
 
 3 FOI Act s 36(3). 
 4 Re McKinnon and Secretary, Department of the Treasury (2004) 86 ALD 138; 
McKinnonv Secretary, Department of Treasury (2005) 145 FCR 70; McKinnon (2006) 229 ALR 
187. 
 5 McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2006] HCATrans 239, 29 (Kirby J, 18 May 
2006). 
 6 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 43(1). 
 7 FOI Act s 58(2). 
   
M.U.L.R. — Author — printed 5 March 2007 at 6.07.52 PM — page 963 of 11
  
2006] Case Notes 963 
     
documents. Part of the Tribunal’s review process is to determine whether a 
document falls within one of the exempt categories. 
The category in question in McKinnon concerned internal working documents 
that are exempt if they: 
(a) would disclose matter in the nature of, or relating to, opinion, advice or 
recommendation obtained, prepared or recorded, or consultation or delib-
eration that has taken place, in the course of, or for the purposes of, the 
deliberative processes involved in the functions of an agency or Minister 
or of the Government of the Commonwealth; and 
(b) would be contrary to the public interest.8 
Obviously, not all internal working documents are exempt under this section 
and access will only be refused if disclosure would be contrary to the public 
interest. 9  This requires a consideration of the public interest and raises the 
question: who should decide what this is? When a decision is challenged by an 
applicant in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the Tribunal has the power to 
decide whether a document falls within this particular exemption, including the 
public interest element. However, the scope of the Tribunal’s review can be 
limited significantly if the Minister decides to issue a conclusive certificate. 
Under s 36(3), if a Minister is satisfied that disclosure of an internal working 
document would be contrary to the public interest, he or she may sign a certifi-
cate that establishes this ‘conclusively’. The Minister must give notice of the 
grounds of public interest upon which his or her decision is based.10 
If an applicant appeals to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal when a certifi-
cate has been issued, the Tribunal must first be satisfied that the document in 
question is an internal working document. In Re McKinnon and Secretary, 
Department of the Treasury, Downes P held that two letters sent to the Treasury 
by third parties were not internal working documents.11 The letters were from 
housing industry bodies that had made representations to the government about 
the First Home Owners Scheme. The Treasury also sought to rely upon the 
business affairs exemption for the letters.12 All the other documents covered by 
the certificates were held to be internal working documents.13 Listed in full in a 
schedule to the Tribunal decision, they included internal minutes, emails, 
briefing papers, draft correspondence, spreadsheets, and briefs prepared for 
Ministers for parliamentary question time.14 
Once the Administrative Appeals Tribunal is satisfied that a document subject 
to a conclusive certificate is an internal working document, the Tribunal cannot 
then make its own decision about whether disclosure would be contrary to the 
 
 8 FOI Act s 36(1). See also McKinnon (2006) 229 ALR 187, 189–90 (Gleeson CJ and Kirby J), 
195 (Hayne J). 
 9 See, eg, Re Bartl and Secretary, Department of Employment, Education, Training and Youth 
Affairs (1998) 54 ALD 509. 
 10 FOI Act s 36(7). 
 11 (2004) 86 ALD 138, 158. 
 12 See FOI Act s 43. 
 13 Re McKinnon and Secretary, Department of the Treasury (2004) 86 ALD 138, 161 (Downes P). 
 14 Ibid 163–80 (Downes P). 
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public interest. Under s 58(5) of the FOI Act, the Tribunal is limited to determin-
ing whether reasonable grounds exist for the claims made in the certificate: 
Where application is or has been made to the Tribunal for the review of a deci-
sion refusing to grant access to a document in accordance with a request, being 
a document that is claimed to be an exempt document under section 36 and in 
respect of which a certificate is in force under that section, the Tribunal shall, 
in a case where it is satisfied that the document is a document to which para-
graph 36(1)(a) applies, if the applicant so requests, determine the question 
whether there exist reasonable grounds for the claim that the disclosure of the 
document would be contrary to the public interest. 
The difference between this limited form of review and the power the Tribunal 
has to review other claims for exemptions under the FOI Act can be demon-
strated by the way the Tribunal dealt with the letters containing representations 
to the government from the housing industry bodies. Downes P decided that the 
letters were not internal working documents and that therefore the conclusive 
certificate did not protect them from disclosure.15 The Treasury also argued that 
the letters contained commercial information and so were protected by the 
business affairs exemption under s 43.16 The test for this exemption is whether 
disclosure could reasonably be expected to unreasonably affect business affairs 
or prejudice further supply of information. There is no provision for conclusive 
certificates for this exemption. Downes P substituted his own opinion on whether 
the documents were exempt, and held that they were not.17 
For documents that are internal working documents and subject to a conclu-
sive certificate, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal must determine whether 
reasonable grounds exist. This is not a question of whether the claim about 
public interest is itself reasonable, but whether there are reasonable grounds for 
the claim. Beyond deciding this question, the Tribunal has no power to review 
the Minister’s decision to issue the certificate. 18  How the Tribunal should 
approach review under s 58(5) was the central question in this case as it pro-
ceeded through the appeal courts.19 
I I I   GROUNDS LISTED FOR THE CONCLUSIVE CERTIFICATE 
The Treasurer signed conclusive certificates for the bracket creep and First 
Home Owners Scheme documents sought by McKinnon. The grounds on which 
the certificates were based concerned confidentiality and the possibility that the 
information might mislead the public. More specifically, that officers of depart-
ments should be able to communicate freely and confidentially in writing with 
Ministers on sensitive and controversial matters, as they might otherwise do 
 
 15 Ibid 161. 
 16 Ibid 140, 158–9 (Downes P). 
 17 Ibid 161. See also FOI Act s 58(1). 
 18 FOI Act s 58(3). 
 19 See McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury (2005) 145 FCR 70, 73 (Tamberlin J), 78–9 
(Conti J), 123 (Jacobson J); McKinnon (2006) 229 ALR 187, 188 (Gleeson CJ and Kirby J), 
193–4 (Hayne J), 213 (Callinan and Heydon JJ). Cf Re McKinnon and Secretary, Department of 
the Treasury (2004) 86 ALD 138, 140 (Downes P). 
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orally. The Treasurer stated that it is important to maintain proper records of 
these communications and that the possibility of disclosure might make officers 
reluctant to commit such matters to writing. The Treasurer also claimed that the 
release of documents outlining options that had not been settled upon might 
mislead the public, and that information intended for an audience with special 
knowledge of technical terms and jargon could be misinterpreted. Also, disclo-
sure of sensitive material that had been prepared in response to parliamentary 
questions would, the Treasurer claimed, threaten the Westminster-based system 
of government.20  
The Treasurer’s list drew upon grounds from earlier cases that have subse-
quently had a mixed reception.21 The grounds relied upon were general and did 
not address each document individually. Such use of ‘pro forma’ style grounds in 
conclusive certificates gives rise to very real concerns that class claims will 
develop and that presumptions will be made that disclosure of documents of a 
certain kind will always be contrary to the public interest without looking at 
individual documents in specific contexts.22 
In the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Downes P held that the listed grounds 
were not irrational, but that their rationality did not decide the matter.23 The 
grounds were less persuasive because they were general and so Downes P 
considered whether each individual claim could be supported.24 To do this his 
Honour examined the documents and considered evidence led by both sides. 
How Downes P went about this process was analysed in some detail in the 
appeals. Some of the evidence was given in private hearings under procedures 
that also apply to certificates issued for documents reasonably expected to cause 
damage to national security, defence and international relations.25 McKinnon’s 
lawyers were able to cross-examine Treasury witnesses, but were excluded from 
parts of the hearings that disclosed the contents of the documents. They did not 
have access to the documents and so the evidence led by witnesses supporting 
disclosure was quite general. When the matter came before the High Court, 
several members of the Court expressed some frustration about this lack of 
access.26  The Federal Court and High Court were not given access to the 
documents.27 
Much of the evidence given on behalf of McKinnon emphasised the impor-
tance of freedom of information in a democracy and made general comments 
about the way government departments work. The evidence against disclosure 
 
 20 See Re McKinnon and Secretary, Department of the Treasury (2004) 86 ALD 138, 144–5 
(Downes P).  
 21 See ibid 146–50 (Downes P). 
 22 This was argued by the Australian Press Council in its amicus curiae submission: see Australian 
Press Council, Australian Press Council Amicus Curiae Brief in the High Court Appeal, 
McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury (17 April 2006) <http://www.presscouncil.org. 
au/pcsite/fop/fop_subs/amicus_foi.html>. 
 23 Re McKinnon and Secretary, Department of the Treasury (2004) 86 ALD 138, 142, 146–7. 
 24 Ibid 144–5. 
 25 See FOI Act s 58C. 
 26 McKinnon (2006) 229 ALR 187, 192–3 (Gleeson CJ and Kirby J), 199 (Hayne J). 
 27 McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2006] HCATrans 239, 39 (Gleeson CJ, 18 May 
2006), 62 (Kirby J, 18 May 2006). 
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from the Treasury officers, on the other hand, directly addressed the claims in 
relation to the documents.28 The following comment by Downes P about one of 
the applicant’s witnesses is revealing and demonstrates the difficulties faced by 
applicants in such cases: 
Much of Mr Stutchbury’s evidence [the then Editor of The Australian] concen-
trated on the public interest in free and informed community debate and upon 
the robustness of modern government which can accommodate such debate. 
This is not to be doubted. However, there remains a legitimate potential public 
interest in letting government get on with its role without unnecessary intrusion 
and distraction. Provided the latter view is a reasonable view it will be difficult 
to upset a conclusive certificate based on it.29 
Downes P held that the evidence given in private by the Treasury officers 
supported the claims made in the certificates and that the cross-examination did 
not demonstrate that they were unreasonable.30  
IV  HOW SHOULD THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL 
DECIDE WHAT CONSTITUTES ‘REASONABLE GROUNDS’? 
A  The Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
The Tribunal held that reasonable grounds existed for the claims made in the 
Treasurer’s certificates.31 Downes P did not balance the competing claims about 
the public interest. His Honour interpreted his task as follows:  
It is not for me to decide which of the opinions of the applicant’s and respon-
dent’s witnesses are preferable. That is not the s 58(5) task. Provided there is a 
reasonable basis for an opinion and there is evidence to support it the test in 
s 58(5) will be satisfied.32 
B  The Federal Court 
McKinnon appealed to the Full Federal Court arguing that this interpretation 
of s 58(5) involved an error of law.33 A majority of the Court dismissed the 
appeal. 34  Jacobson J rejected the argument that the Tribunal is required to 
balance competing factors. His Honour concluded that approaching the task in 
that way would ‘negate the reasonable grounds concept and permit the Tribunal, 
through the back door, to come to its own opinion of what is in the public 
 
 28 Re McKinnon and Secretary, Department of the Treasury (2004) 86 ALD 138, 150 (Downes P). 
 29 Ibid 151. 
 30 Ibid 152. 
 31 Ibid 161 (Downes P). 
 32 Ibid 152. 
 33 McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury (2005) 145 FCR 70, 91 (Conti J), 131 (Jacob-
son J); see also Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 44(1). Other errors were also 
argued, which included the way the Tribunal dealt with the appellant’s evidence, its construction 
of ‘the public interest’, and the procedures adopted for the taking of evidence in private: at 101, 
107–8, 114 (Conti J).  
 34 Ibid 77 (Tamberlin J), 144 (Jacobson J). Conti J dissented: at 123. 
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interest.’35 Tamberlin J agreed that it is not necessary for the Tribunal to weigh 
all the other possible facets of the public interest.36  His Honour interpreted 
s 58(5) as posing a ‘threshold question of whether there is any non-absurd or 
rational ground for a claim’.37 This reference to ‘any’ meant, literally, that one 
rational ground was sufficient.38 
Conti J dissented and would have remitted the matter to the Tribunal.39 His 
Honour took a very different view to all other judges involved in the case. 
Conti J focused upon the words ‘determine the question’ in s 58(5) and held that 
this obliged the Tribunal to undertake a balancing exercise.40  
C  The High Court 
McKinnon’s counsel argued before the High Court that Downes P had not 
taken the public interest considerations that favoured disclosure into account in 
any meaningful way.41 He argued again that s 58(5) requires the Administrative 
Appeals Tribunal to undertake a balancing exercise and that the approach 
adopted by the Tribunal, and upheld by the Federal Court, rendered the review 
process essentially meaningless. 42  The High Court rejected the appellant’s 
central argument that the Tribunal’s task involves balancing the various facets of 
the public interest.43 The majority and minority judges then adopted different 
approaches when explaining what was required of the Tribunal.  
Gleeson CJ and Kirby J dissented. Their Honours rejected the Federal Court 
majority’s view that applications for review under s 58(5) must fail if just one 
facet of the public interest supports non-disclosure and asked: ‘How, then, could 
an applicant ever succeed?’ 44  Their Honours argued that the Tribunal was 
required to take all relevant considerations into account: 
Until all relevant considerations, that is, all (known) considerations that could 
have a rational bearing upon the claim, or state of mind, or decision under re-
view, are taken into account, it is impossible to form a just and fair judgment 
whether, objectively considered, there are reasonable grounds for the claim that 
the disclosure of the document would be contrary to the public interest. It is not 
enough for the tribunal to ask whether there are facts, or opinions, or arguments 
that rationally bear upon that topic. All relevant matters must be taken into ac-
count; not for the purpose of deciding whether the tribunal agrees with the min-
ister, but for the more limited purpose of deciding whether there are reasonable 
grounds for the claim which the minister accepted.45 
 
 35 Ibid 140. 
 36 Ibid 74. 
 37 Ibid. 
 38 Ibid 76–7. 
 39 Ibid 78. 
 40 Ibid 91–2. 
 41 McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2006] HCATrans 239, 81 (J E Griffiths, 18 May 
2006). 
 42 Ibid 23 (J E Griffiths, 18 May 2006). 
 43 McKinnon (2006) 229 ALR 187, 193 (Gleeson CJ and Kirby J), 221 (Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
 44 Ibid 192. 
 45 Ibid 191. 
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Their Honours found it difficult to ascertain exactly what the approach was 
that Downes P had adopted. Some passages in Downes P’s decision suggested 
that his Honour may have taken account of all relevant considerations, and yet 
that was not the view adopted by the Federal Court when it upheld the deci-
sion.46 Gleeson CJ and Kirby J would have allowed the appeal and remitted the 
matter to the Tribunal for consideration of all relevant matters before deciding 
whether there were reasonable grounds to support the claims.47 
Hayne J agreed that the Federal Court majority had been wrong when it held 
that one rational reason favouring non-disclosure was sufficient.48  
Rather, the tribunal’s task is to decide whether the conclusion expressed in the 
certificate (that disclosure of particular documents would be contrary to the 
public interest) can be supported by logical arguments which, taken together, 
are reasonably open to be adopted and which, if adopted, would support the 
conclusion expressed in the certificate.49 
This involves taking into account any relevant evidence and arguments pre-
sented to the Tribunal.50 Hayne J held that Downes P had done so and dismissed 
the appeal.51 
Callinan and Heydon JJ also dismissed the appeal and took a more restrictive 
approach. Their Honours considered the grounds listed in the conclusive 
certificates in some detail and found that certain of these grounds were more 
persuasive than others. 52  The importance of protecting candour in written 
communications, the problems associated with the release of tentative conclu-
sions, and the need to maintain confidentiality before release to Parliament were 
cogent grounds. However, their Honours found the grounds that the information 
might be misleading to the public far less convincing. The information could be 
explained and given context by the Minister.53 The public can, they held, be 
trusted to understand technical material and there are experts who can assist with 
interpretation. 54  Despite this ambivalence about some of the grounds, their 
Honours held that there were ‘a number of grounds of claim which the tribunal 
was entitled to hold were reasonable and such as to justify conclusiveness.’55  
Callinan and Heydon JJ reasoned that the best approach for the Tribunal when 
determining this issue would be to simply examine the documents and the stated 
grounds. Their Honours thought it important that the Tribunal avoid balancing 
various interests and held that it ought not ‘[t]o have regard to extraneous 
matters such as other competing reasons, if the requisite statutory reason for 
 
 46 Ibid 192–3. 
 47 Ibid 193. 
 48 Ibid 202, 204. 
 49 Ibid 203 (emphasis in original). 
 50 Ibid 204. 
 51 Ibid 206–7. 
 52 Ibid 220–1. 
 53 Ibid 220. 
 54 Ibid. 
 55 Ibid 221. 
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non-disclosure has been demonstrated’.56 Their Honours acknowledged that this 
meant 
that if one reasonable ground for the claim of contrariety to the public interest 
exists, even though there may be reasonable grounds the other way, the conclu-
siveness will be beyond review. It is important to notice that the statutory lan-
guage does not give an entitlement to access if there are, as often there may 
very well be, reasonable grounds for the revelation of the document in the pub-
lic interest.57 
This may mean that the only means of challenging a conclusive certificate is to 
demonstrate that there are in fact no reasonable grounds, or that the grounds are 
so unreasonable that no reasonable person could accept them.58 In McKinnon, 
Callinan and Heydon JJ held there were a number of grounds that the Tribunal 
could have found to be reasonable.59 
V  JUDICIAL REVIEW MAY BE A POSSIBILITY 
Gleeson CJ and Kirby J, in dissent, proposed an approach that would have 
required the Tribunal to consider all relevant material.60 This is similar to the 
oversight of the administrative decision-making process exercised by courts 
when they undertake judicial review on the grounds that relevant considerations 
have not been taken into account. The majority did not support this approach for 
the Tribunal’s review under s 58(5) of ministerial decisions.61 However, in obiter, 
Hayne J made some interesting comments on judicial review that may offer 
another possibility for future applicants faced with conclusive certificates. 
McKinnon had obtained reasons from the Treasurer under s 13 of the Adminis-
trative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) but made no application for 
judicial review in this case. Instead he sought review by the Tribunal under the 
FOI Act and then pursued appeals on an error of law claim through the courts. 
Hayne J suggested that McKinnon could have applied to the Federal Court for 
judicial review.62 His Honour referred to the possible grounds of an error of law 
or an improper exercise of power.63 During the hearing before the High Court, 
Hayne J expressed particular interest in whether there was an argument that the 
Minister had failed to take account of relevant considerations.64  
Given the limited scope of review by the Tribunal under s 58(5) when Minis-
ters sign conclusive certificates, judicial review proceedings that investigate 
whether a Minister has failed to consider relevant considerations, or has consid-
 
 56 Ibid. 
 57 Ibid 222. 
 58 Ibid. 
 59 Ibid 221. 
 60 Ibid 192. 
 61 Ibid 202 (Hayne J), 222 (Callinan and Heydon JJ). 
 62 Ibid 197. 
 63 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5(1)(f), (1)(e). 
 64 McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2006] HCATrans 239, 50 (Hayne J and J E 
Griffiths, 18 May 2006). 
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ered irrelevant ones, when signing the certificates may be of some use.65 The 
remedies available include declarations that may offer some assistance to 
applicants.66 While not as effective as the full merits review that the Administra-
tive Appeals Tribunal normally undertakes, these remedies compare favourably 
to the procedures under the FOI Act. Even when the Tribunal does find that no 
reasonable grounds exist to support a conclusive certificate, the Tribunal simply 
makes a determination that is communicated to the Minister. The Minister may 
decide not to revoke the certificate despite this finding and instead read a notice 
of that decision to Parliament.67  
The High Court has considered the possibility of judicial review of freedom of 
information decisions before. In Shergold v Tanner,68 the Court held that the 
phrase ‘establishes conclusively’ does not oust the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Court to judicially review a Minister’s decision to issue a certificate in a freedom 
of information case.69 In that case Lindsay Tanner, then federal Shadow Minister 
for Transport, sought access under the FOI Act to documents on waterfront 
reform from the Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small 
Business. Before the matter was appealed to the Administrative Appeals Tribu-
nal, the Secretary of the Department signed conclusive certificates as the 
Minister’s delegate. Rather than pursuing a Tribunal application, Tanner sought 
judicial review in the Federal Court of the Secretary’s decision to issue the 
certificates. 70  The High Court held that the conclusive certificates operated 
within the scope of the FOI Act and the statutory provisions did not impliedly 
repeal the Federal Court’s jurisdiction to exercise judicial review.  
While judicial review may be an interesting option to pursue for future free-
dom of information applicants facing conclusive certificates, there is reason for 
caution. In Shergold, the High Court noted that the grounds for judicial review 
might have only limited operation for applications concerning conclusive 
certificates about the public interest when the Minister’s discretion is broad: 
For example, the range of relevant considerations may be very wide and the 
range of irrelevant considerations very narrow. The content of a requirement to 
provide natural justice to the person aggrieved by the decision may be very 
limited.71 
The High Court left these questions for further consideration by the Federal 
Court. The case did not proceed: Tanner decided not to pursue the matter further 
because of significant costs and delays. 
 
 65 See Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 5(1)(e), (2)(a), (2)(b). 
 66 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) s 16(1)(c). Other remedies available 
include: orders quashing or setting aside the decision: s 16(1)(a); orders remitting the matter to 
the decision-maker subject to directions: s 16(1)(b); and orders directing any of the parties to do, 
or to refrain from doing, any act the court considers necessary to do justice between the parties: 
s 16(1)(d). 
 67 FOI Act s 58A. 
 68 (2002) 209 CLR 126 (‘Shergold’). 
 69 See ibid 139 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). This is irrespective of 
whether the Federal Court has jurisdiction under Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 
1977 (Cth) s 8(1) or Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B. 
 70 Shergold v Tanner (2000) 102 FCR 215. 
 71 (2002) 209 CLR 126, 138 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh. Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 
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VI  CONCLUSION 
The High Court decision in McKinnon leaves freedom of information appli-
cants facing conclusive certificates that, if accompanied by carefully drafted 
grounds, effectively preclude review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 
The argument that the Tribunal must balance competing facets of the public 
interest before determining whether the grounds relied upon in a conclusive 
certificate are reasonable left open some scope for an independent assessment of 
the public interest during external review. That approach has been rejected. 
Judicial review may offer an alternative form of review, however costs and 
delays involved in court proceedings may be a major disincentive for applicants 
such as journalists seeking information for current stories. In addition, while 
judicial review may offer remedies that are more flexible than the restricted 
procedures under ss 58 and 58A of the FOI Act, the court will not substitute its 
own view of the public interest for that of the Minister. After the High Court’s 
decision in McKinnon, many called for reform. 72  Although not necessarily 
expressed in these terms, full external merits review is what they seek. Legisla-
tive reform, specifically repeal of the conclusive certificate process for internal 
working documents, is the only way that access to documents of this kind will be 
effectively opened up. 
 
 
 72 See, eg, ‘Calls for Urgent Reform of FOI’, The Canberra Times (Canberra), 7 September 2006, 
2; Nicola Roxon, ‘Freedom of Information under Attack’, The Advertiser (Adelaide), 8 Septem-
ber 2006, 22; ‘The Failure of FOI’, The Canberra Times (Canberra), 9 September 2006, 2. 
